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We examined 89 offers in the most recent Brazilian IPO wave between 2004 and 2007, 
all listed in premium segments of the exchange that demand better corporate governance 
practices. Two non-US underwriters dominated the market, often acting as co-leaders and 
rarely as second-tier underwriters. Twenty-eight percent of issuers received pre-IPO loans 
from underwriters, which may constitute a conflict of interest. Syndicate membership 
increased with offer size, suggesting that distribution risk was relevant. Underwriter 
compensation increased with offer size, but percentage fees suggested scale effects. There 
was no evidence in favor of the relevance of underwriter reputation, certification, and price 
discovery roles. The study brings a portrait of underwriter relationships in this unique 
period of the Brazilian capital market.  
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1 – INTRODUCTION   
 
Brazil is one of the largest economies in the world. The country averaged 3.8 
percent in gross domestic product (GDP) growth per year between 2000 and 2008 
(WORLD BANK, 2015), a spur that unfortunately subsided recently. Concomitantly, there 
was wave of 89 initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock in its market between 2004 and 
2007. The number of IPOs reached an all time peak in 2007. There were only 84 IPOs in 
the 25 years prior to 2004 and only three in the five years before that year. There were 35 
IPOs in the five years following 2007 (BM&FBovespa, the Securities, Commodities, and 
Futures Exchange of Brazil, 2015). New regulation, the creation of premium listing segments 
wherein companies voluntarily commit to extra corporate governance and transparency 
requests, among other advances, and a favorable view of the Brazilian economy in the 
years preceding and during the IPO wave may have motivated investors to buy them (LEAL, 
2011). All IPOs between 2004 and 2007 listed in those new segments of the exchange. 
The international financial crisis of 2008 ended the IPO wave. Foreign investors acquired 
an average of 70 percent of the volume issued from 2004 through 2007. This declined to 
an average of 58 percent between 2008 and July 2015, and to 40 percent between 2012 
and July 2015 (BM&FBOVESPA, 2015).  
The uniqueness of this Brazilian IPO wave motivated the examining of the quantity 
of lead underwriters, their compensation and relationships in the syndicates. We relate 
them to IPO characteristics, such as initial market-adjusted returns, ex-ante uncertainty, 
and offer size. Sixty-eight percent of IPOs had more than one lead underwriter and there 
were co-managers in 70 percent of them. Two institutions, Credit Suisse (CS) and UBS-
Pactual (UBS), the Brazilian operation of UBS at the time, dominated the market, often 
partnering as lead underwriters. UBS sold its Brazilian operation to a Brazilian banker in 
April of 2009 as a consequence of its large losses elsewhere. UBS resumed operations in 
Brazil in 2010 as a much smaller outfit. Thus, this period is unique because of its 
unprecedented IPO activity and the dominance of CS and UBS as underwriters.  
We contribute to the literature by providing a description of this IPO wave in one of 
the largest world economies and by presenting peculiar underwriting arrangements and 
relationships employed at the time, which may have brought about serious conflict of 
interest concerns. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) propose the information production 
hypothesis stating that lead underwriters acquire information from potential investors to set 
the offer price. Corwin and Schultz (2005) report that the adjustment between the mid 
point of the preliminary offer price range and the final offer price maintains a positive 
relationship with the number of lead underwriters in the syndicate. Hu and Ritter (2007) 
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argue that syndicates are a mechanism to compensate underwriters for analyst coverage, 
which increases share liquidity and company awareness. Commercial banking services, 
especially lending, may compensate underwriters for analyst coverage as well, as 
suggested by Santos, Silveira, and Barros (2009) in Brazil. Leal (2004) did not find any 
relationship between underwriter reputation and the ex-ante uncertainty in a sample of 
Brazilian IPOs between 1979 and 1992.  
Our results indicate that lead underwriter dollar fees were proportional to the offer 
size, as expected, while the percentage fees suggest scale effects. Offer size may influence 
the number of lead underwriters but the relationship with the number of second-tier 
underwriters is not clear. There is a positive relationship between first day market-adjusted 
returns, which may represent the ex-ante uncertainty, and the number of lead underwriters, 
consistently with Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Hu and Ritter (2007). CS and UBS 
seldom acted as second-tier underwriters and often appear as IPO co-leaders. The largest 
US investment banks were present but not very active in the Brazilian IPO market at the 
time. Perhaps CS and UBS obtained a superior local advantage in the integration of their 
international distribution ability and local wealth management and investment banking 
capabilities. The largest Brazilian financial institutions often acted as second-tier 
underwriters possibly because they did not have the same international distribution 
competence.  
The next section presents a brief review of the related literature, followed by a 
discussion of the main results and conclusions.  
 
2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) describe an information environment in which the 
activity of underwriters upon investors results in the revelation of private information about 
the actual company market value. Information is acquired and incorporated into the price 
formation process until underwriters establish an offer price. Chemmanur and Krishnan 
(2009) argue that the ability of coordinating banks to spread information about the issuer 
contributes to the discovery of the intrinsic value and, consequently, the offer price. Dong 
and Michel (2009) and Chemmanur and Krishnan (2009) state that greater investor 
heterogeneity stems from the ability of coordinating banks and contributes to better price 
discovery as well.  
Financial intermediaries usually form syndicates to share structuring activities and to 
accomplish the selling effort in equity offerings. One or more financial institutions lead or 
coordinate the syndicate. Corwin and Schultz (2005) list information production, 
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certification via reputation, analyst coverage, and market making as the functions of IPO 
coordinating institutions. The preparation of the issuer and market, when lead banks 
gather and disseminate information that may contribute to the intrinsic value discovery, 
and the selling and price stabilization efforts in the secondary market, are the two stages of 
the IPO process, according to Pichler and Wilhelm (2001).  
Corwin and Schultz (2005) argue that the relationship between coordinating 
institutions is vital to the composition of syndicates. A set of contracts among banks and 
between banks and the issuer formalize IPO syndicates. It is common to have a main 
contract between the lead underwriter and the issuer, and additional contracts between the 
leader and other banks, delegating some of its tasks. The lead manager has discretion to 
choose the other syndicate members, but the issuer and its main shareholders may 
influence syndicate formation. Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) assert that the leader may try to 
maximize its compensation at the cost of reducing issuer returns. The issuer should try to 
link underwriter compensation and potential outcomes when contracting the leader.  
Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) highlight the mutual selection between 
banks and issuers. Issuers seek price certification, attractive share prices, and price 
stabilization. Banks pursue large and easier to place offers and issuers that are more likely 
to survive over time. The mutual selection may settle based on the value and price of 
services as well as on prior business relationships between the issuer and underwriters. Hu 
and Ritter (2007) conclude that initial returns result from a non-cooperative bargaining 
game between issuers and underwriters. Syndicates prevent that issuers become captive of 
the leading bank, while compensating banks for analyst coverage, which contributes to 
price discovery, and other financial services. Hu and Ritter (2007) describe an environment 
analogous to the Brazilian market because all IPOs between 2004 and 2007 employed 
book building and most displayed syndicates.  
Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) argue that the selling efforts of underwriters build 
reputation and that their relationships are intangible assets, which are difficult to replicate 
in the short term, enable them to obtain quasi-rents. The stability of association structures 
between institutions sustains joint gains, even though banks compete fiercely for syndicate 
leadership. Yet, Leal (2004) did not find a relationship between underwriter reputation and 
ex-ante uncertainty proxies for Brazilian IPOs between 1979 and 1992.  
The leader carries out most of the work, gets a larger proportion of the shares to 
allocate using its discretion and clients, and collects more for its services. The leader has 
no interest to share its leadership because IPO coordination increases the likelihood to 
participate in follow-on offers. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) evince that only a few 
issuers switch coordinating banks in subsequent offers. Participating banks, accordingly, 
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have no strong incentives to cooperate with the leader in the bid setting. Co-managers 
distribute smaller offer portions and their compensation may consist of fixed and variable 
portions, depending on the quantity of shares effectively placed. The variable 
compensation component under dispute among co-managers is called "jump ball". The 
inclusion of more coordinators also comes at a cost to issuers because it may increase 
absolute compensation (CORWIN and SCHULTZ, 2005; PICHLER and WILHELM, 2001).  
Lead underwriters accept more syndicate members as offer volume increases. The 
bargaining model of Hu and Ritter (2007) predicts that the price range disclosed in the 
preliminary offering memorandum increases with the number of lead underwriters. This 
may result from competition among banks, but does not derive from the information 
production model. The Hu and Ritter (2007) model assumes that underwriters compete 
using analyst coverage, the preliminary price range, and offer price, rather than 
compensation.  
There is evidence that a larger number of coordinating banks leads to better offer 
price discovery. Corwin and Schultz (2005) find a positive relationship between the 
number of banks in the underwriting syndicate and the adjustment between the midterm of 
the preliminary price range and the offering price. They obtained a similar result for the 
presence of more co-managers. Hu and Ritter (2007) showed that larger syndicates lead 
to higher offer prices because members tend to compete more during the road show. 
Dong and Michel (2009), however, did not observe lower initial returns in the presence of 
more coordinating banks. They conjecture that offer prices are only partially adjusted to 
compensate investors for information revelation. Interestingly, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) 
affirm that coordinating banks do not contribute to price discovery in Australian IPOs 
between 1994 and 1999. IPOs executed without financial intermediaries displayed lower 
first-day initial returns than those brought about by underwriters.  
Schenone (2004) reports that initial returns are lower for IPOs led by banks that 
previously lent to issuers, possibly reflecting less information asymmetry. Santos et al. 
(2009) reveal that lead underwriters often lent to issuers prior to Brazilian IPOs between 
2004 and 2007. The authors argue that issuers used these pre-IPO loans to prepare and 
be more attractive at issuance, fetching a higher price and, thus, yielding a larger 
compensation for underwriters. The IPO proceeds paid for the loans. Santos et al. (2009) 
claim that this practice results in a conflict of interest because borrowing issuers 
underperform in the long-term aftermarket relative to non-borrowers, even though their 
initial returns evidence is analogous to Schenone's (2004). Twenty-eight percent of issuers 
contracted pre-IPO loans with their underwriters, which averaged US$ 155 million or 
about 30 percent of IPO gross proceeds (SANTOS et al., 2009).  
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This brief review of the literature suggests three conjectures for empirical 
verification: (1) the offering price and the mid point of the preliminary price range will be 
closer to the closing price on the first trading day in offerings with more than one 
coordinating bank (better price discovery); (2) there will be more coordinating banks in 
larger offers (distribution risk); and (3) it is more likely that riskier issuers have only one 
coordinating bank in their IPOs, but with greater reputation (ex-ante uncertainty).  
 
3 – RESULTS 
 
The sample consists of 89 IPOs that took place between 2004 and 2007. All 
Brazilian headquartered IPOs listed at the new premium corporate governance segments 
of BM&FBovespa, with 86 percent of them listing in the two most demanding segments. 
None listed in the traditional segment, used by all earlier IPOs (BM&FBOVESPA, 2015). 
Bloomberg® was the source of market price data. IPO filings with the Brazilian Securities 
Commission (CVM, Comissão de Valores Mobiliários) provided the hand-collected IPO 
data. We analyzed preliminary and final offering memoranda, market notifications, and 
mandatory public announcements. A list with IPO details is available upon request.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables defined in its notes. The 
average and median first day market-adjusted returns (MAR) were 5.65 and 3.44 percent, 
respectively. Santos et al. (2009) and Pinheiro and Carvalho (2011) present similar figures 
for the same time period. Aggarwal et al. (1993), contrastingly, report a much higher 
average market-adjusted return of 78.5 percent for 62 IPOs that took place between 
1980 and 1990. These earlier results come from a time that Brazil experienced very high 
inflation rates and economic volatility, under a different regulatory environment and closed 
financial market, when the special corporate governance listing segments did not exist. In 
most cases, the midrange price is equal to the offer price. In most cases, the midrange 
price is equal to the offer price.  
The average IPO size was approximately US$ 360 million. This is greater than the 
sum of all 66 IPOs between 1979 and 1992 (LEAL, 2004). The underwriting fee is about 
four percent, lower than the typical seven percent fee in the US (CHEN and RITTER, 2000). 
Underwriter prestige measures may be difficult to compare with those in the US given the 
different IPO and underwriter market characteristics of the two countries. The prestige 
measures herein are also different from those used in Leal (2004). The typical number of 
lead underwriters was two, with two co-managers.   
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for selected variables for 89 Brazilian IPOs from 2004 to 2007   
Variable Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
Offer characteristics:    
SIZE (BRL million) 795.01  548.68  977.97  
MAR (%) 5.65  3.44  9.76  
MIDCHG (%) -3.59 0.00  15.47  
RANGESIZE (%) 27.28  27.78  9.17  
COMP (BRL million) 29.71  22.52 27.56 
FEE (%) 4.05 4.00 1.14 
Underwriter prestige:    
CM 7.54  8.00  1.87  
JM 2.56  3.00  0.69  
MW (%) 25.67  28.96  15.20  
No. of underwriters:    
LEAD 2.01  2.00  0.78  
COMAN 2.18  2.00  1.19  
SYND 4.19  4.00  1.40  
Notes: SIZE is the volume offered in millions of Brazilian reais (BRL). MAR is the first day market adjusted 
return defined as (Pc/Po)/(Ic/Io)-1, where Pc, Po, Ic, and Io are, respectively, the closing and opening market 
prices and Ibovespa index levels on the first trading day. MIDCHG is the percentage change from the middle 
of the preliminary price range to the offer price, and proxies for price dispersion. RANGESIZE is the 
percentage increase from the lower to the upper value of the preliminary price range. COMP is the gross 
compensation paid to lead underwriters in BRL million. FEE is the percentage compensation paid to 
underwriters relative to the offer volume. CM, JM and MW are measures of reputation based on Carter and 
Manaster (1990), Johnson and Miller (1988), and Megginson and Weiss (1991), respectively. LEAD is the 
number of first-tier lead underwriters. COMAN is the number of second-tier co-manager underwriters. SYND 
is the number of first-tier and second-tier underwriters in the syndicate. The average USD value in the period 
was BRL 2.22. Source: Bloomberg® for market price data and the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) 
for hand collected IPO data.  
 
We computed the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables in Table 1. 
They are not reported in the article but are available upon request. As expected, the 
coefficients among the underwriter prestige measures were significant at the five percent 
level and all of them are greater than 0.7. The same is observed among the number of 
underwriters in the syndicate. Thus only one underwriter prestige measure and one 
underwriter count should be used simultaneously in any model. The natural logarithm of 
the offer size is negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage underwriter fee 
(-0.19), suggesting that there may be scale effects in the compensation of underwriters. 
The natural logarithm of the offer size is positively and marginally significantly correlated 
with the number of underwriters in the syndicate, indicating that multiple underwriters are 
more common in larger offers. The five IPOs with offer size greater than BRL 1.5 billion 
(about US$ 680 million) had three or four lead underwriters.  
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Table 2 shows that the most common number of lead underwriters and co-
managers was four. The number of lead underwriters in the period ranged from one to 
four but the median was two. There were two lead underwriters in most IPOs. Table 3 
presents average offer characteristics according to the number of lead and co-manager 
underwriters. The number of co-managers declined with the increase in lead underwriters. 
There are more lead underwriters as the offer size increases. Naturally, absolute 
underwriter compensation increases with offer size. However, the average underwriter 
percentage fee declines with the offer size, suggesting that there are scale effects once 
again. The number of co-managers does not unambiguously vary with the offer size and 
underwriter percentage fee, except for the largest offers. One may observe the same for 
the total number of lead and co-manager underwriters. Thus, the relationship between the 
number of first-tier underwriters, average offer size, and average underwriter percentage 
fees seems clear, but it does not transpire when second-tier underwriters are considered.  
 
Table 2 – Lead and co-manager underwriters in 89 Brazilian IPOs from 2004 to 2007 by year 
  Lead and Co-Managers Lead Underwriters Co-Managers 
Year # IPOs Median % > 1 Median % > 1 Median % > 1 
200
4 7 5 86% 2 57% 3 71% 
200
5 9 5 100% 2 89% 3 67% 
200
6 20 4 95% 2 80% 2 85% 
200
7 53 4 96% 2 74% 2 89% 
Source: Bloomberg® for market price data and the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) for hand 
collected IPO data.  
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Table 3 – Offer characteristics by the number of lead and co-manager underwriters of 89 Brazilian 

















1 22 – 2.1 551.2 23.2 4.2% 
2 48 – 2.2 590.7 24.3 4.1% 
3 15 – 2.0 998.3 37.1 3.8% 
4 4 – 1.5 3825.0 103.0 3.4% 
Co-managers: 
0 14 2.2 – 727.6 30.7 4.4% 
1 4 2.5 – 747.1 25.0 3.3% 
2 33 1.9 – 638.7 25.9 4.1% 
3 28 1.6 – 628.3 25.5 4.0% 
4 10 1.8 – 1891.2 54.6 3.6% 
Lead and co-manager underwriters:  
1 4 1.0 0.0 527.0 27.7 5.2% 
2 4 2.0 0.0 382.1 14.6 3.8% 
3 16 1.8 1.3 770.4 31.9 4.3% 
4 30 1.9 2.1 573.7 21.7 3.9% 
5 24 2.0 3.0 677.4 27.6 4.0% 
6 6 2.7 3.3 939.0 38.9 4.1% 
7 3 3.0 4.0 1027.8 40.1 4.0% 
8 2 4.0 4.0 6304.6 148.6 2.4% 
Notes: average offer size and fee in BRL millions; the average USD value in the period was BRL 2.22. 
Source: Bloomberg® for market price data and the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) for hand 
collected IPO data.  
 
Table 4 details underwriter relationships. UBS and CS clearly dominated the 
market. There are no clear reasons for their prevalence, but a survey of business news 
suggests that it was due to their pioneering investment in the segment in the period 
preceding this IPO wave and the retention of organized sell-side analyst teams. Moreover, 
considering the appetite of foreign investors for Brazilian IPOs in those years, their 
international distribution capacity, aided by integration of their wealth management and 
investment banking businesses, granted them an edge over their competitors. They rarely 
accepted to be second-tier underwriters (co-managers) in the period. Conversely, financial 
institutions that were less often lead underwriters seemed more likely to join large 
syndicates. The main Brazilian financial institutions in the occasion, Bradesco, Itaú, and 
Unibanco, did not have the same international banking integration and capacity as CS 
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and UBS. However, it is not clear why the US investment banks were not as active as CS 
and UBS. Possibly they did not build the same local capababilities as CS and UBS.  
 













Invited to be lead underwriters:  
UBS Pactual - 9 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 
Credit Suisse 6 - 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Itaú 9 5 - 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Merrill Lynch 3 0 1 - 0 1 0 1 0 
Unibanco 4 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 
JP Morgan 0 2 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 
Morgan Stanley 1 2 0 0 1 0 - 1 0 
Bradesco 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 - 0 




25 19 5 5 2 3 3 4 1 
Invited to be co-managers: 
UBS Pactual - 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Credit Suisse 3 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Itau 2 2 - 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Merrill Lynch 2 1 0 - 1 0 0 0 0 
Unibanco 7 0 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 
JP Morgan 0 1 0 0 0 - 1 1 0 
Morgan Stanley 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 
Bradesco 9 4 0 1 2 3 1 - 0 





23 8 0 1 4 3 4 1 0 
Total invitations 
made (3) = (1) 
+ (2) 




36 24 6 5 4 4 3 2 1 
(1)/(4) 0.69 0.79 0.83 1.00 0.50 0.75 1.00 2.00 1.00 
(2)/(4) 0.64 0.33 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.75 1.33 0.50 0.00 
(3)/(4) 1.33 1.13 0.83 1.20 1.50 1.50 2.33 2.50 1.00 
Note. We considered 85 IPOs coordinated by the most active underwriters between 2004 and 2007. 
Source: Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) for hand collected IPO data.  
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 Empirical regression models had the first day market-adjusted return (MAR), the 
offer price percent change relative to preliminary offer price midrange, and the percentage 
underwriter fee as dependent variables. The explanatory variables consisted of the lead 
and co-manager underwriter counts, underwriter reputation measures, and offer size.  
The regressions in Table 5 suggest a positive and statistically significant association 
between market-adjusted first day returns (MAR), the "money left on the table", and the 
number of lead underwriters, or the sum of lead underwriters and co-mangers. This 
contradicts the hypothesis that more underwriters could lead to better price discovery, but 
is consistent with the hypothesis that greater ex-ante uncertainty would be associated to 
larger syndicates. The number of first and second-tier underwriters lost statistical 
significance in regression 4 of Panel A in Table 5 in the presence of the natural logarithm 
of the offer size, but this regression is problematic because size is positively correlated with 
the number of lead and co-manager underwriters in the syndicate. It is also possible that 
larger offers are more difficult to distribute and consequently underwriters underprice them 
more and use larger syndicates to sell them. There is no significance for the percentage 
change between the middle of the preliminary price range and the offering price. This is 
not surprising because this variable is zero in most IPOs. Table 5 also shows that there is 
no relationship between the number of lead and co-manager underwriters and the 
percentage underwriter fee. The underwriter prestige measures displayed no significant 
correlation with the first day market-adjusted returns and the percentage change between 
the middle of the preliminary price range and the offering price. Therefore, we did not 
include these variables in the regressions in Table 5. Leal (2004) used very different 
proxies for underwriter prestige but did not find any significant relationship with initial IPO 
returns as well.  
Table 6 depicts the relationships between the size of the preliminary price range, 
defined as the percentage increase from the lower to the upper value of the range, and the 
number of key underwriters, underwriter prestige, and offer size. There is no significance 
for any of the coefficients in Table 6. Ex-ante uncertainty, represented by the relative size of 
the preliminary price range, is not related to the number of lead underwriters, underwriter 
prestige, or the offer size. Leal (2004) found that initial returns increased with ex-ante 




Table 5 – Initial return, price adjustment, fees, and number of first and second tier underwriters  
Panel A – Dependent variable: first day market-adjusted return (MAR) 
Regression Intercept 














1 0.0005 0.0278    4.48 0.04 
 (0.02) (2.12)*      
2 0.0291  0.0125   2.09 0.01 
 (1.35)  (1.45)     
3 -0.0178   0.0177  5.99 0.05 
 (-0.56)   (2.46)*    
4 -0.9399   0.0062 0.0480 8.31 0.14 
            (-3.21)*   (0.79) (3.16)*   
Panel B – Dependent variable: offer price percent change relative to preliminary offer price midrange 
(MIDCHG) 
5 -0.0431 0.0036    0.03 0.00 
 (-0.94) (0.17)      
6 -0.0830  0.0216   2.49 0.02 
 (-2.44)*  (1.58)     
7 -0.1065   0.0169  2.07 0.01 
 (-2.06)*   (1.44)    
8 -1.2019   0.0032 0.0571 3.64 0.06 
 (-2.47)*   (0.24) (2.26)*   
Panel C – Dependent variable: percentage underwriter fee (FEE) 
9 0.0453 -0.0024    2.30 0.01 
 (13.52)* (-1.52)      
10 0.0434  -0.0013   1.68 0.01 
 (17.24)*  (-1.30)     
11 0.0476   -0.0017  3.88 0.03 
 (12.60)*   (-1.97)    
12 0.1018    -0.0030 3.30 0.03 
 (3.02)*    (-1.816)   
Note: Cross-section ordinaly least squares regressions for 2004 to 2007 Brazilian IPOs. All variables defined 
in Table 1. Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. * denotes significance at the five percent level.  
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Table 6 – Ex-ante uncertainty, syndicate size, and underwriter reputation 
Regression Intercept LEAD COMAN SYND CM JM MW LSIZE F Adj. R2 
1 0.2776 -0.0024       0.04 -0.01 
 (10.17)* (-0.19)         
2 0.2645  0.0038      0.22 -0.01 
 (12.94)*  (0.46)        
3 0.2642   0.0021     0.09 -0.01 
 (8.50)*   (0.29)       
4 0.2591   0.0020 0.0007    0.05 -0.02 
 (5.24)*   (0.28) (0.14)      
5 0.2089   0.0017  0.0221   1.27 0.01 
 (4.45)*   (0.25)  (1.56)     
6 0.2596   0.0021   0.0174  0.08 -0.02 
 (7.25)*   (0.30)   (0.27)    
7 -0.0461   -0.0018    0.0162 0.59 -0.01 
 (-0.15)   (-0.23)    (1.04)   
Note: Cross-section ordinaly least squares regressions for 2004 to 2007 Brazilian IPOs. The dependent 
variable is MIDCHG, the offer price percent change relative to preliminary offer price midrange. LSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of SIZE. All variables defined in Table 1. Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. * denotes 
significance at the five percent level.  
 
 
4 – CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study examined an unprecedented wave of 89 Brazilian IPOs marketed 
between 2004 and 2007. A favorable perception about the Brazilian economy, 
institutional and regulatory advances, and the introduction of new segments in the local 
exchange with more stringent corporate governance and transparency requirements 
possibly enticed foreign and local investors to purchase these new shares. The wave ended 
with the international financial crisis.   
Two financial institutions, Credit Suisse and UBS-Pactual, clearly dominated the 
market and frequently co-led many offers. They rarely acted as second-tier underwriters. 
Prominent local and US institutions did not achieve such prowess. It is possible that they 
did not have the same integration between their local investment bank and wealth 
management affairs with their international distribution capabilities. It is also likely that US 
institutions did not compete in equal terms because their home regulations prevent them to 
underwrite offers from companies with whom they have other business and financial 
interests, such as pre-IPO loans identified in 28 percent of the offers in this period 
(SANTOS et al., 2009).  
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The results offered weak evidence that underwriters form larger syndicates when the 
ex-ante uncertainty, represented by the first day market-adjusted returns, is apparently 
greater. This is consistent with Dong and Michel (2009) and contradicts Hu and Ritter 
(2007) and Corwin and Schultz (2005), lending no support for the price discovery 
conjecture, even under an improved corporate governance practices environment. Yet, an 
alternate proxy for ex-ante uncertainty, the offer price percent change relative to 
preliminary offer price midrange, failed, probably because most of its values are null.  
The most reliable conclusion of this article favors distribution risk, given the 
weakness of these results. Syndicates increase with offer size simply because they are more 
difficult to sell. Underwriter compensation increased with offer size, but percentage fees 
suggested scale effects. The evidence confirmed the lack of influence of underwriter 
reputation in previous Brazilian studies. It is quite possible that underwriting market 
concentration, with two dominant institutions, renders reputation issues less relevant. The 
most remarkable difference in relation to earlier IPOs is the much lower first day market-
adjusted returns, possibly indicating significantly lower ex-ante uncertainty under a more 
favorable economic and corporate governance backdrop.  
The results herein also point out to the need of in-depth case studies of the IPO 
underwriting arrangements in this period. It is important to shed more light about the 
competitive advantages of the two dominant institutions that enabled them to command 
such as large IPO market share. Another area for future qualitative investigation is if the 
pre-IPO loans were a factor in the underwriter market concentration. The concomitant use 
of pre-IPO loans, with their potential to give way to conflicts of interests, with listing in 
premium corporate governance segments of the exchange is ironical and deserves further 
investigation.  
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